We address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.
where the ij entry, i, j = A, B, is the payoff of the first (row) player when it plays the 67 strategy i and the second (column) player plays the strategy j. We assume that both 68 players are the same and hence payoffs of the column player are given by the matrix 69 transposed to U ; such games are called symmetric. 70 Let us assume that during a time interval of the length ε, only an ε-fraction of the 71 population takes part in pairwise competitions, that is plays games. Let p i (t), i = A, B, 72 be the number of individuals playing at the time t the strategy A and B respectively, 
be average payoffs of individuals playing A and B respectively. 76 We assume d < b < a < c, so there exists a unique mixed evolutionarily stable 77 strategy ( [15, 16] ), x * = b−d b−d+c−a , which represents the equilibrium fraction of an 78 infinite population playing A [11, 26] . In the replicator dynamics, x * is globally 79 asymptotically stable and there are two unstable stationary states: x = 0 and x = 1.
80
Now we would like to take into account that individuals are born some units of time 81 after their parents played. We assume that time delays depend on strategies and are 82 equal to t − τ A or t − τ B respectively. 83 We propose the following equations:
We divide (2) by (3) for i = A, obtain the equation for x(t + ε) ≡ x A (t + ε, subtract 84
x(t), divide the difference by ε, take the limit ε → 0, and get an equation for the 85 frequency of the first strategy,
which can be also written as
Let us notice that unlike in the standard replicator dynamics, the above equation for 88 the frequency of the first strategy is not closed, there appear in it a variable describing 89 the size of the population at various times. One needs corresponding equations for the 90 population size. From (2) and (3) we have
To trace the evolution of the population, we have to solve the system of equations, 92 (5,7), together with initial condition on the interval
We assume that 94
It can be shown (see Proposition 2 in SI) that if the initial functions ϕ x , ϕ p are 95 continuous on [τ M , 0) and non-negative, then there exists a unique, non-negative 96 solution of the system ((5), (7) ) with the initial conditions (8) which is well defined on 97 the interval [0, +∞).
Stationary state 99
We derive here an equation for a stationary state of the frequency of the first strategy. 100 Let us assume that there exists a stationary frequencyx such that x(t) =x for all t ≥ 0 101 and for some suitably chosen function p(t). Then average payoffs of each strategy are 102 constant and are equal to
Thus, equation (7) becomes a linear delay differential equation,
Note, that solutions of (10) with non-negative initial conditions are non-negative. This 105 implies that the leading eigenvalue of this equation is real. The eigenvalues λ of (10)
Assume now that λ is a solution of (11) (of course λ depends onx) and 108 p(t) = p 0 exp(λt) for some p 0 .
109
We plug such p into (4) and we get two stationary solutions of (4) (i.e. such that the 110 right-hand side of (4) is equal to 0),x = 0, 1 and possibly interior ones -solutions to 111
If τ A = τ B , then (12) gives us a mixed Nash equilibrium (an evolutionarily stable 112 strategy) of the non-delayed replicator dynamics,
If τ A = τ B , we have then λ = ln(Ū A /Ū B )/(τ A − τ B ). Plugging it into (11) we conclude 114 thatx satisfies an equation
The above reasoning leads immediately to the following proposition which explains 116 in what sensex is a stationary state of the replicator dynamics ((5), (7) ). 
Then the functions 120
are solutions of the system ( (5)- (7) ) with the initial functions
Results

122
To exhibit new types of behavior of evolutionary dynamics with strategy-dependent 123 time delays, we will discuss now two particular games.
124
Example 1
125
Here we consider a game with the following payoff matrix,
We have that x * = 0.75 is the stable stationary state of the replicator dynamics.
127
When delays are parametrized in the following form, τ A = τ, τ B = 2τ and τ 128 increases, then the interior stationary state increases until it disappears at some value of 129 τ . Above that point, x = 1 becomes globally asymptotically stable (see Fig. 1A ). In the 130 case of τ A = 2τ, τ B = τ , the interior stationary state decreases and approaches the value 131
1+
√ 301 50 ≈ 0.37 (see Fig. 1C ). 132 We see in Fig. 1B , that for fixed τ B = 2, there is a value of τ A below which there is 133 no interior stationary point; x = 1 is globally asymptotically stable. Above this point, 134 the interior stationary state decreases. Here we study a game with the following payoff matrix,
Now, x * ≈ 0.345 is the stable stationary state of the replicator dynamics.
150
In Fig 2A we 
. We see that here there exists a threshold τ * ≈ 1.1 151 such that for τ < τ * there exists a unique interior stationary state. Numerical 152 simulations suggest that this state is stable. For τ > τ * there are two interior stationary 153 states. Numerical simulations suggest that if an initial frequency of cooperation strategy 154 is large enough, then the detection strategy is eliminated. 155 In Fig. 2B we present the interior stationary state as a function of τ , τ A = 2τ , 156 τ B = τ . In this case, the stationary state is almost constant. In fact, for this set of 157 parameters, one can easily see that the function F is a decreasing one as both terms of 158 F decrease. Because for chosen τ A and τ B , only the first term depends on τ (and it 159 decreases with increasing τ ) one can deduce that the stationary state is a decreasing 
Conclusion 164
We studied effects of strategy-dependent time delays on stationary states of 165 evolutionary games.
166
Recently effects of the duration of interactions between two players on their payoffs 167 and therefore on evolutionary outcomes were discussed by Křivan and Cressman [14] . In 168 their models, the duration of interactions depend on strategies involved. This naturally 169 can be interpreted as strategy-dependent time delays. They showed that interaction 170 times change stationary states of the system.
171
Another approach is to consider ordinary differential equations with time delays [24] . 172 It was shown that for small time delays, the stationary state is asymptotically stable 173 and at a certain critical time delay, the system undergoes the Hopf bifurcation -the 174 interior state looses stability, oscillations arise. However, it was pointed out in [6] that 175 in the so-called biological model, where it is assumed that the number of players born in 176 a given time is proportional to payoffs received by their parents at a certain moment in 177 the past, the interior state is asymptotically stable for any time delay.
178
Here we observed a novel behavior in two-player games with strategy-dependent 179 time delays. We showed that interior stationary states depend continuously on time 180 delays. Moreover, at certain time delays, the interior stationary state ceases to exist or 181 there may appear another interior stationary state. Our results are qualitatively similar 182 to those obtained in [14] in a completely different model. We considered only a special 183 case study, more systematic investigations are needed, especially concerning classic 184 games describing social dilemmas. It would be also interesting to analyze Supporting information 187 S1 Appendix. Document containing proofs. 188 We provide here propositions, theorems, and their proofs which support results 189 presented in the paper. Additional remarks are also included. Proof. The local existence of the solutions follows immediately from a standard theory 194 of delay differential equations, [4] . The non-negativity follows from [1] . To prove the 195 global existence it is enough to use the step method and to observe that on the interval 196 0, min{τ A , τ B } system (5), (7) becomes a system of non-autonomous ordinary 197 differential equations. The equation for p becomes linear and can be solved and the 198 equation for x then is also linear with respect to x(t).
199
Interior stationary states are given by zeros of the function F (x) defined in (13) .
201
Remark 3. We see that forx = 0 we have
while forx = 1 we have
where W p is the Lambert W function, that is a principle branch of the relation
We show that if τ A = τ B , the value of interior stationary state depends on time 206 delays. Moreover, for some pay off matrices and some values of delay, multiple interior 207 stationary states exist. We would like to point out that these relations are not linear It turns out, that if the eigenvalue λ(x) corresponding to the stationary frequencyx 215 is positive, then the frequency of the given strategy is larger than the frequency of this 216 strategy in a non-delayed case if the delay corresponding this strategy is larger. We 217 have the following 218 Proposition 4. Let a < c and d < b. Assume thatx ∈ (0, 1) and let λ be the leading 219 eigenvalue that corresponds tox. Then if λ > 0 we have
Proof. Assume that τ A > τ B . Then the sign of λ is the same as the sign of
Note, that φ(x * ) = 0 and
sign of λ is opposite to the sign of φ(x) and thereforex > x * .
226
We will study general properties of F , they will help us to determine a number of 227 stationary states of our replicator dynamics. First, we determine conditions that would 228 imply the sign of F at x = 0 and x = 1. Let us define Proof. First, we study the sign of F (1). It is easy to see that
.
Assume that τ A > τ B . Due to the assumption a < c there exists z ∈ (0, 1) such that 239 a = zc. Plugging this into the expression for F (1) we obtain
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Let us introduce u = z τ A /(τ A −τ B ) . Then, the above expression simplifies to
It is easy to see that f a is a continuous strictly increasing function of u and 242 lim u→0 − f a (u) = −∞. Thus, two possibilities are possible. Either f a (1) ≤ 0 and f a (u) < 0 243 for all u ∈ (0, 1) (thus F (1) < 0 for all a < c) or there exits u * ∈ (0, 1) such that 244 f a (u * ) = 0 and f a (u) < 0 for 0 < u < u * , and f a (u) > 0 for u * < u < 1 (and this 245 implies appropriate sign of F (1) depending on the value of a with respect to c).
246
Note, that f a (1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to a ≥ 1. Assume now, that a < 1 and we find u * . 247 We have
Thus,
where c * (a) is given by (16) . Thus, if a > 1 and c < c * (a), then F (1) > 0 and 251 the point (i) is proved. Finally, note that if τ A < τ B then in the variable u changes from 252 1 to +∞ instead of from 0 to 1 and very similar arguments leads to the assertion of the 253 point (ii).
254
Let us calculate the value 255
Note that this situation is analogous to the previous one and analogues arguments 256 proves this part of theorem.
257
If the function F is monotonic, then the previous theorem gives us a condition 258 guaranteeing the existence of a solution of F (x) = 0 on (0, 1) that is the existence of an 259 interior stationary state. 
The assumptions guarantee that ad − bc < 0, d − c < 0 and a − b < 0 and the thesis 265 follows. Proof. We check if the equation F (x) = 0, where F is given by (13) , has a solution 279
x ∈ (0, 1) for fixed τ B and small τ A . It is easy to see that the function F is continuous 280 with respect to τ A and x for τ A < τ B . Thus, it is enough to check the existence of 281 solution to F (x) = 0 for τ A = 0. In this case, the function F simplifies to
Calculating the derivative of F 0
we see that it is a decreasing function of x ∈ (0, 1) (as a > b) and therefore, F 0 is
then F 0 is decreasing in (0, 1);
then F 0 has exactly one maximum at (0, 1) at the point 287
Let us consider the first case. Here, F 0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1), because it is decreasing 288 and F 0 (1) > 0. Thus, F 0 is an increasing function of x and as lim lim
has a zero in the interval (0, 1) if and only if F (1) > 1. An easy calculation allows to 290 derive the condition (a).
291
Now, let us consider the second case. Some algebraic manipulations leads to
We show that F 0 (x max ) approaches to its supreme either for τ B → +∞ or for Now it is easy to see that h has at most one zero for z > 0 and it is negative for z close 298 to 0. Hence, the function h is decreasing for small z and it may increase for large z 299 having at most one minimum for z > 0. Thus, it approaches to its supreme either for and b < 1 then there exist one or two interior 307 equilibrium statesx ∈ (0, 1) for τ A < τ B close enough to 0 if τ B is large enough. In fact 308 if a < 1 for sufficiently large τ B there exits two equilibrium statesx ∈ (0, 1).
309
If τ A is small enough (for fixed τ B ) or, reversely, if τ B is large enough (for fixed τ A ), 310 there exists no interior stationary state. Thus, it is possible to calculate these threshold 311 values τ * A and τ * B . It can be seen that the interior stationary state disappears when it 312 merge with the stationary state 1. Thus, looking for τ * A and τ * B such that F (1) = 0, 313 after some algebraic calculation we obtain the implicit formula 
We have that τ A < τ * A or for τ B > τ * B there exists no interior stationary state. 
